Disinherited Doesn't Mean Powerless: Standing to Challenge Trust Amendments in Probate Court

Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822

Trust litigators run into this scenario constantly: a settlor amends her trust late in life, cuts out a child who was previously a beneficiary, and dies. The disinherited child suspects incompetence, undue influence, or fraud — but the moment she goes to probate court, she's told she has no standing because, under the trust's final version, she isn't a beneficiary at all. Isn't that circular?

The California Supreme Court said yes, and fixed it, in Barefoot v. Jennings.

The Facts

Joan Lee Maynord created a family trust in 1986. Her daughter, Joan Mauri Barefoot, was named a beneficiary and successor trustee. Between 2013 and 2016, Maynord executed eight amendments that eliminated Barefoot's share entirely, removed her as successor trustee, and enlarged another daughter's interest. After Maynord died, Barefoot petitioned the probate court, alleging the amendments were invalid because her mother was incompetent and the changes were the product of undue influence and fraud.

The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of standing — reasoning that because the challenged amendments removed Barefoot as a beneficiary, she wasn't a "beneficiary" entitled to petition under Probate Code section 17200. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court took up the case to resolve the standing question and reversed unanimously.

The Circularity Problem

The lower courts' logic had an obvious flaw: it let the very validity of the challenged amendments determine whether the challenger could even be heard on that validity. If the amendments were the product of fraud or undue influence, they'd be void — meaning Barefoot would still be a beneficiary under the prior, valid version of the trust. Treating her as a non-beneficiary before that question was decided put the cart before the horse.

The Supreme Court held that section 17200 grants standing to individuals who claim that trust amendments eliminating their beneficiary status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud — so long as the amendments' invalidity would restore the challenger's beneficiary status. The court also reaffirmed the basic pleading-stage rule: when standing is challenged on a motion to dismiss or demurrer, the court must treat the well-pleaded allegations as true first, and only then decide whether those allegations establish standing.

Why the Statute Supports This Reading

The court walked through the statutory scheme methodically. Section 17200(a) lets a "trustee or beneficiary" petition the court concerning a trust's internal affairs or existence; section 17200(b)(3) lets the court determine the validity of a "trust provision" — a term that naturally includes amendments. Section 24(c) defines "beneficiary" broadly, as anyone with a present or future interest, vested or contingent. Read together, someone who would have a future interest if the amendments are struck down fits comfortably within that definition.

The court also leaned on the long-standing principle that the Probate Code was meant to broaden probate court jurisdiction to cover practically all controversies between trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries — and that section 17206 gives probate courts wide latitude to enter whatever orders are necessary to resolve the petition before them.

The Court's Guardrails

The defendants warned that this reading would "invite chaos" by letting anyone claiming a stake in a trust interfere with its administration. The court pushed back: the holding doesn't open the door to just any claimant — only to those whose well-pleaded allegations show they'd have an interest in the trust if the challenged amendments are proven invalid. That's a real pleading burden, not an open door.

The court also expressly declined to decide a related question left for another day: whether an heir who was never a trust beneficiary at any point has standing to challenge the trust under the Probate Code. Barefoot is limited to previously-named beneficiaries who were later written out.

Practical Takeaways

• Plead the "but-for" interest clearly. A petition challenging trust amendments on incompetence, undue influence, or fraud grounds should affirmatively allege that, absent the challenged amendments, the petitioner would be a beneficiary — that allegation is what carries the standing analysis.

• This is a pleading-stage fight. Defendants can't simply point to the current, amended trust language and argue standing away; the court has to accept the challenger's allegations as true before evaluating standing.

• The holding is narrow by design. It doesn't extend standing to heirs who were never named as beneficiaries under any version of the trust — that issue remains open.

• Early resolution in probate court is the point. The court framed this as an efficient, orderly mechanism to litigate these challenges early, before the trust is administered based on potentially invalid amendments — worth citing when opposing a motion to compel separate civil litigation of the same issue.

Barefoot closes a standing loophole that would otherwise have let bad actors insulate fraudulent or coerced trust amendments from meaningful challenge simply by using those same amendments to write the challenger out of the picture.

This post discusses Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 and is provided for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.